Public manifestations of backchannel diplomacy: the case of the 2013 Iranian Nuclear Agreement

Abstract

On 24 November 2013, the Geneva Joint Plan of Action ( JPA) was signed between Iran and the P5 + 1, the first international agreement between the United States and Iran in over three decades. On the surface, the negotiations proceeded relatively smoothly, with the interlocutors arriving at a deal after just three rounds of dialogue. Within hours of the deal announcement however, the Associated Press revealed that the United States and Iran had been involved in backchannel negotiations, having secretly met approximately five times since March 2013 (Klapper et al. 2013a). In spite of its marginal position in the wider study of foreign policy and diplomacy, backchannel diplomacy remains an important tool tapped on by states, particularly between adversarial states attempting to normalise/ mend relations. Historical examples include efforts to normalise Sino-US relations in the 1970s, and between the UK and Northern Irish political parties in the late 1990s. More contemporary case studies include efforts to break the deadlocked nuclear negotiations between United States and Iran, and the normalisation of relations between the United States and Cuba through Vatican backchannelling. The concept of backchannel diplomacy is conventionally understood as diplomatic activity (such as negotiations or meetings between heads of states) that is deliberately concealed from public attention, and is at times referred to as secret or clandestine diplomacy. Two parts of diplomatic activity may be concealed: the process and knowledge of the activity, and the eventual outcome and agreement arising from that activity. In the preFirst World War era characterised by “old diplomacy”, secret diplomacy was the norm, and both process and outcome were concealed (LegueyFeilleuzx 2009; Nicolson 1977). However, with the advent of the two world wars, and the growing demands for democratic accountability over foreign policy, contemporary backchannel diplomacy often only conceals the process of negotiation and may at times parallel public negotiations (Pruitt 2008). This partial concealment potentially opens contemporarybackchannel diplomacy to domestic pressures, since the eventual agreement is often subject to public scrutiny. The implications of this partial concealment will be the focus of this chapter. Existing literature on backchannel diplomacy assumes that it is secret. However, research arising from constructivist thought on the importance of discourses for legitimising action, and the domestic dynamics of foreign policy, raises important questions about whether backchannel diplomacy could encompass a public dimension. If foreign policy is constrained by domestic public opinion, and discursive strategies are vital for legitimising policy change, it is not far-fetched to expect this same dynamic playing out in backchannel diplomacy – that actors will engage in public, but tacit, discursive strategies to “prepare the ground” during the backchannelling period for the eventual policy revelation, particularly if it occurs between adversarial states. In this chapter, I explore the question of whether the conduct of backchannel diplomacy encompasses a public dimension. If so, what are the theoretical foundations for expecting this, and how does it manifest? The chapter begins with a review of existing literature, showing that existing research continues to operate with the assumption that backchannel diplomatic processes occur in isolation from domestic and public interactions. Following that, I propose a theoretical framework for understanding the public dimension of backchannel diplomacy. I argue that public shifts in discourse are a constitutive part of backchannel diplomacy when it is practised between adversarial states attempting to mend relations, because actors privy to the negotiations are likely to seek to legitimise the policy agreement domestically. I test this theory through a discourse analysis of remarks and speeches made by President Obama about Iran in the lead up to the Geneva Joint Plan of Action ( JPA) signed in November 2013. I find strong preliminary evidence for my theory, as various “negative” identities about Iran are deemphasised during the backchannelling period, and occurs before the election of Hassan Rouhani. These findings have substantial implications for both theory and practice as it changes the way backchannel diplomacy is conceptualised, and provides a potential avenue for detecting the presence of back channels. I conclude the chapter with possible methodological improvements and avenues for future research.