Abstract

This article examines rationales for public intervention in health insurance markets from the perspective of public economics. It draws on the literature of organizational design to examine alternative public intervention strategies, including issues of contracting, purchaser provider splits, and regulation of competition. Health insurance reforms in four Latin American countries are then considered in light of the insights provided by the theoretical literature.

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