Public Goods Equilibria Under Closed - and Open - List Proportional Representation

Abstract

Building on past research, this paper develops a game theoretic model to study the provision of public goods under Closed- and Open-List Proportional Representation. The core results suggest that legislators will provide voters with higher levels of public goods in OLPR than in CLPR systems. However, two intervening variables condition the institutional comparison: the district magnitude and electoral volatility. Firstly, public goods effort increases with district magnitude in OLPR systems, but tends to decrease with district magnitude in CLPR systems. Indeed, when magnitude is M = 2, CLPR and OLPR are often indistinguishable. Furthermore, the distinction between the two systems will weaken when electoral volatility is low, since in such circumstances neither system generates high levels of public goods effort. In addition to their relevance for political-economy, the paper's results provide game theoretic foundations for a series of theoretical conjectures found in Carey and Shugart's (1995) seminal study of electoral institutions and legislative personalism.