Abstract
This paper studies the public good provision problem, in which the principal faces a constitutional constraint in the sense that in order for a public good provision mechanism to be implemented, it must first be approved by agents under a prespecified voting rule. We find that as long as the voting rule is not the unanimity rule, the principal can propose a mechanism such that first-best efficiency of provision of the public good is achieved. We also consider various constraints, such as prohibition of discriminatory mechanisms or the existence of interest groups and vote buying, which may prevent the proper functioning of the mechanism we propose. We discuss the optimal voting rule in such situations.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
