Public Funding of Political Parties and Rada Members in Post-Electoral Period

Yuliia Shaipova

doi:10.18523/kmlpj249898.2021-7.51-76

Abstract

This study addresses the issue of the efficiency of public funding mechanisms. Using the Ukrainian experience as an example, the article covers recently introduced amendments and their effect on the overall efficiency of public funding. Further, the article analyzes possible ways for mitigating existing shortcomings of public funding mechanisms and outlines suggested solutions. Complemented with semi-structured interviews with current Members of Rada, the article strives to provide insights and suggestions to issues of political independence, political corruption, accountability, and transparency.

Highlights

Ukraine’s politicians’ dependence on oligarchs has long been a problem that needed to be addressed as a priority
It should be noted that public funding has long been regarded as an efficient tool ensuring financial independence of political parties and MPs
What constitutes an efficient mechanism of public funding of political parties?

Summary

Introduction

Ukraine’s politicians’ dependence on oligarchs has long been a problem that needed to be addressed as a priority. Since the mechanism of public funding is one of the factors that reduces dependence of politicians on financial and industrial groups, research question arises: which model of public funding of Members of Parliament (MPs) and political parties is the most effective and acceptable for Ukraine, given Ukrainian legal and political realities?

Results

Conclusion