Abstract
A public decision model specifies a set of alternatives, a variable population, and a common set of admissible preferences. We study the implications of the principle of solidarity, for social choice functions in all such models. The principle says that when the environment changes, all agents not responsible for the change should either all weakly win, or all weakly lose. Under weak additional requirements, but regardless the domain of preferences, each of two formulations of this principle, population-monotonicity and replacement-domination, imply coalition-strategy-proofness; that the choice only depends on the set of preferences that are present in the society, but not on the number, nor on the labels of agents having particular preferences; and that there exists an alternative always weakly Pareto-dominated by the alternative selected by the rule. Replacement-domination is generally at least as strong as population-monotonicity.
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