Psychosemantics of “One-China” Conception: Fourth-Dimensional Resolution of Taiwan-Mainland Political Deadlock

Abstract

The political conflicts between Taiwan and the Mainland have progressed, for over 50 years, from the historical “hot civil war” for the “exclusive ownership” of one China’s territorial sovereignty to the contemporary “cold rhetoric circularity” around the “geopolitical symbolism” of the one-Chinaprinciple. In the process, the United States has been intimately entangled in the disputes in terms of 3 alignment stages-from an “unambiguous pro-Taiwan” before the 1970s, the “ambiguous neutrality” in the early 1970s, to the contemporary “pro-Mainland China.” Despite the fact that during the past 3 decades the United States honored the arms sales and the Taiwan Relations Act commitments in Taiwan’s favor, and simultaneously conferred the “3 Nos” and 3 communiques in Mainland China’s favor, the cross-Strait tensions have persisted without the prospect of a definitive foreseeable resolution. Further, because of the lack of explicit conception of “one China,” the United States has to constantly resist the opposing persuasions of the 2 sides, and therefore must continue to rely on the “ambiguous dual deterrence strategy” for maintaining the “dynamics balance” over the Taiwan Strait. For such endeavors, the Clinton “4 frameworks” and the Bush “5 Taiwan policies” have proven to be very effective, but mostly to the extent of assuming a “passive” role in preventing military confrontations.