Abstract
Psychoneural reduction has been debated extensively in the philosophy of neuroscience. In this article I will evaluate metascientific approaches that claim direct molecular and cellular explanations of cognitive functions. I will initially consider the issues involved in linking cellular properties to behaviour from the general perspective of neural circuits. These circuits that integrate the molecular and cellular components underlying cognition and behaviour, making consideration of circuit properties relevant to reductionist debates. I will then apply this general perspective to specific systems where psychoneural reduction has been claimed, namely hippocampal long-term potentiation and the Aplysia gill-withdrawal reflex.
Highlights
Scientists can seemingly have little time for philosophy
This uncertainty is not apparent in metascientific analyses that appeal to prominence (Bickle 2003), but it weakens the frequently claimed reductionist explanation of memory in this system, without requiring the critique that the work was only done in Aplysia (Looren de Jong and Schouten 2005), or philosophical debate over whether Kandel’s account appeals to psychological aspects and is not an actual psychoneural reduction (Gold and Stoljar 2009)
Claims to understanding associated with psychoneural reductions often rely on concepts and analyses driven by the need to limit variables to facilitate interpretations
Summary
Scientists can seemingly have little time for philosophy (see Lipton 2005). Zeki (1993, p 7) claimed that philosophers engage in “endless and fruitless discussion.”. Scientists take a philosophical position whenever they discuss knowledge or make claims to understanding. Lichtman and Smith (2008, p 5) wrote in support of neural imaging that “just as most humans learn about football by watching...watching may be the most efficient route to understanding”. In discussing connectomic approaches to neural circuits, Lichtman and Sanes (2008, p 349) wrote that structure “may enable predictions of circuit behaviour”, and Morgan and Lichtman (2013, p 496) wrote that structure “will signify a physiological process without the Can we understood nervous system (or any) activity by observing: could a naïve observer infer the rules of a game without some instruction (e.g. ignore the crowd, celebrations etc.)? In discussing connectomic approaches to neural circuits, Lichtman and Sanes (2008, p 349) wrote that structure “may enable predictions of circuit behaviour”, and Morgan and Lichtman (2013, p 496) wrote that structure “will signify a physiological process without the
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