Psychology, Theism, and Methodological Naturalism

Abstract

If one thinks that entities such as God and human souls exist, then it is important to ensure that one's conception and practice of scientific inquiry does not preclude the possibility of recognizing their causal influence on the world. This chapter argues that attempts to insist that methodological naturalism be regarded as the condition sine qua non of scientific inquiry are mistaken. Scientific inquiry should not be constrained by a methodology which legislates in advance of considering the evidence, that only naturalistic explanations of phenomena be considered acceptable. If there is empirical evidence which suggests the operation of immaterial entities such as the human soul or God, psychologists should be free to consider such evidence. Author briefly considers the various justifications that are routinely given for adopting methodological naturalism. He argues that these attempts fail to demonstrate that science should be defined in terms of the practice of methodological naturalism. Keywords:God; human soul; methodological naturalism; psychology; scientific inquiry; theism