Psychology from a constructionist perspective: An interview with Kenneth J. Gergen

Abstract

Ever since psychology severed its formal connections with philosophy it has been plagued with crises of one or another kind with respect of its subject matter, methodology, and applications to social and psychological problems. At the same time its scope has expanded to encompass almost every aspect of human affairs (e.g., education, business, politics, medicine, the arts, sports). Within this extensive array, a broad and heterogeneous mix of theoretical positions and research methods may be located. Yet, despite the apparent diversity, almost all of these endeavors are guided by and achieve unity through an empiricist “metaphysics of methodology,” as Robinson (1981) has put it. Under the reigning mode the answers to most existing problems within these fields are to be found in data: increasing amounts generated with increasingly rigorous procedures. Theories are to be accepted or rejected on the basis of systematically procured evidence. From an outsider’s perspective, the players in the academic guild are comfortable, not because the culture has obviously benefitted by their efforts, but because they are true to the rules of the game-the science game. They are doing their best as scientists under the prevailing assumptive regime. There was nothing else to be done. Notwithstanding the theoretical problems inherent in this disciplinary voyage, the history of psychology has usually been depicted as a narrative of progressprogress in ideas, methods, and applications. This narrative has been maintained even though no significant breakthroughs in theory or predictive capability have been noticeable. Perhaps the passing of time gave a sense of chronological maturity, which strengthened the belief in development and progress. Yet, within recent years a certain malaise has become discernible. Increasingly, state-of-the-art assessments of the reflections on the conceptual foundations of psychology (Bruner, 1990; Danziger, 1990; Koch, 1985; Rose, 1985; Sampson, 1977; Shotter, 1990) have occasioned serious questioning about basic metatheoretical, methodological, and ideological assumptions. These discussions have centered on both endogenous and exogenous issues. In the endogenous case discussions of the lack of cumulativeness of research findings, impossibility of broad-scale generalizations, problems of ecological validity, difficulty in addressing real life issues, and ethical dilemmas, for example, have