Psychologism and the psychology of scientists: A response to Gibson

Abstract

Gibson’s paper outlines a new and increasingly popular perspective on the relationship between cognitive psychology and the philosophy of science. Cognitive psychology, Gibson suggests, is conceptually on a par with and is “making the same sort of claims about the human organism” as contemporary philosophy of science (p. 212). He notes the recent trend of philosophers using psychology, sociology and history to explain how science is practiced (i.e. a descriptive account of science) as opposed to using logic and epistemology to explain how science ought to be practiced (i.e. a normative account of science). Gibson argues that psychological research provides direct evidence (p. 214) for these philosophical theories and a basis for enriching them (p. 214). He argues that understanding the “limitations and validity” of scientists’ reasoning can lead to an understanding of the “limitations and validity of the scientific evidence which is generated” (p. 220). Gibson’s approach is consistent with others who have called for a “psychology of science”, which involves the study of the cognitive characteristics of scientists (e.g. Tweney et al., 1981). Proponents of this view are compelled by arguments that epistemology and logic are inadequate methods to justify normative propositions and, consequently, they assume that questions of justification are ultimately answered by cognitive psychological analyses. In this view cognitive psychology and contemporary philosophy of science are not perceived to be distinct disciplines with different methods and g’oals because philosophical questions can be completely reduced to ones requiting cognitive psychological analyses. While epistemology and logic may inform psychological research, it is assumed that the philosopher’s search for normative standards of scientific inquiry will be derived ultimately from fine-grained cognitive explanations of scientists. Tweney et al. (198 1) write: The psychology of science may eventually lead to’prescriptions for better science, to specific analyses of inquiry processes enabling the design of better inquiry, and perhaps, through analyses of scientists’ thinking processes, to better science education. (p.7) The “psychology of science” view of the relationship between cognitive psychology and philosophy of science is a strong version of the thesis of psychologism. I’sychologism tends to “downplay or deny distinctions between