Abstract

The present paper outlines the nature of a three-dimensional ontology and the place of psychological science within this ontology, in a way that is partly similar to and partly different from that of Pérez-Álvarez. The first dimension is the material realities, and involves different levels (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.), where each level builds on a lower level but also involves the development of new emergent properties, in accordance with Bunge’s emergent materialism. Each level involves systems, with components, structures and mechanisms, and an environment. This dimension can be studied with natural scientific methods. The second dimension is the subjective-experiential realities, and refers to our subjective perspective on the world. In accordance with Husserl’s phenomenology, it is argued that this subjectivity does not exist in the world (i.e., should not be reified as an object among other objects), but represents a perspective on the world that we enter in our capacity as conscious human beings. Essential characteristics of this subjectivity (such as intentionality, temporality, embodiment, and intersubjectivity) can be explored by phenomenological methods. The third dimension is the social-constructional realities, and includes social institutions, norms, categories, theories, and techniques. It is argued that psychological science spans over all three dimensions. Although almost all psychological research by necessity starts from a problem formulation where the subjective-experiential dimension plays an essential role (either explicitly or implicitly), most of present-day psychological research clearly emphasizes the material dimension. It is argued that a mature psychological science needs to integrate all three dimensions.

Highlights

  • The present paper outlines the nature of a three-dimensional ontology and the place of psychological science within this ontology, in a way that is partly similar to and partly different from that of Pérez-Álvarez

  • Examples of ontological questions directly relevant to psychology are: What is the nature of consciousness, sensation, perception, memory, thinking, feeling, intention, expectation, will, desire, hope, fear, joy, sadness, love, anger, empathy, etc.? Or, to turn to more theoretical concepts: What is the nature of human information processing, personality, personal identity, interpersonal relations, etc.? And how are all these things related to each other, and to the nonpsychological world? Traditional questions in this area are formulated in terms of how the Bmind^ is related to (1) external reality, (2) the body, (3) the brain, (4) language, and (5) human society and culture

  • Techniques exist socio-culturally as Borally, textually, and/or practically transferrable knowledge^ – that is, they represent social-constructional realities, products of human creativity, which are available for new generations of individuals to acquire. As this learning takes place, the individual acquires new technical skills and ways of thinking. This psychological learning process spans over all three ontological dimensions: To learn a technique is to develop personal skills and attitudes

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Summary

Ontology and Psychology

Ontology is that part of philosophy which deals with questions about the nature of what exists, and how different aspects of being are related to each other. The position in favor of pluralism that is first taken by Pérez-Álvarez (2017) is later qualified in at least two different ways: (1) first by abandoning Bstrong pluralism^ in favor of a Btripartite^ ontology, which implies a reduction of a potentially pluralistic universe into three different Bworlds^, and (2) by qualifying this tripartite ontology by a streak of monism, in the sense that one of these Bthree worlds^ (i.e., physical reality) is seen as more basic than the others (materialism) In both of these aspects he follows Bueno’s philosophical materialism, which involves three Bgenres of materiality^: (1) the physical world, including all kinds of material bodies from electrons to planets (M1); (2) the subject with its subjective experiences and behavioral activity (M2); and (3) abstract entities, such as concepts, mathematics, social institutions, and cultural things (M3). This dimension is approached from the perspective of Bunge’s (1977, 2010) emergent materialism

Emergent Materialism
Levels are Not Dimensions
The Phenomenological Attitude
Discussion
Developmental Materialism
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Full Text
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