Abstract
People who believe that human attributes are immutable (entity theorists) display preferences for stereotype-consistent over stereotype-inconsistent information (J. E. Plaks, S. J. Stroessner, C. S. Dweck, & J. W. Sherman, 2001). In this article, the authors argue that entity theories are components of broader sets of beliefs that represent differences between people in terms of underlying essences. Consistent with expectations, the authors found that measures of essentialist beliefs (i.e., in the biological basis, discreteness, informativeness, and inherence of human attributes) covaried with the presence of entity theories. Essentialist beliefs as a set were related to stronger preferences for stereotype-consistent information, and this effect was not reducible to the effect of entity theories. The authors propose that research on implicit person theories can be placed within an encompassing framework of psychological essentialism.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
