Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952: Origins of a Special Warfare Capability for the United States Army

Abstract

Abstract : This study examines the United States Army's activities in psychological and unconventional warfare during and after World War II to determine the impetus for, and origins of, the formal 'special warfare' capability created in 1952 with the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. With the impetus of the Korean War, heightening cold war tensions, and the persistent pressures of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., the Army created an unprecedented staff organization in early 1951: the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). Under Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the OCPW guided the build-up of psychological warfare and formulated plans for the creation of an organization unique in the Army's history: the 10th Special Forces Group. Designed to organize, train, and support indigenous personnel in behind-the-lines resistance activities to 'retard' a Soviet invasion in Europe, the Group's true historical forerunner--contrary to the official lineage of Special Forces--was the Office of Strategic Services, not the Rangers or the 1st Special Service Force. To provide the necessary training, materiel, and doctrinal support for both conventional and psychological warfare, McClure convinced the Army to establish the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.