Abstract

This article is dedicated to the study of psychological and communicative aspects of nuclear deterrence. Author emphasizes that rationality of political agents is a crucial condition, specifying that it must be realist or neorealist rationality. The article shows that deterrence results in “delicate balance of terror” — the situation when none of political agents can maximize its gains by only changing his strategy. Nevertheless, political subjects try to change situation developing military technologies and altering their doctrines.

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