Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy: A Symposium Edited by Sidney Hook (review)

Abstract

Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy: A Symposium. Edited by Sidney Hook. New York: New York University Press, 1959. Pp. xiii-l-370. $5.00. This volume is a report ofthe second annual meeting of the New York University Institute ofPhilosophyheld in March,1958, at which a number ofpsychoanalysts metwith a distinguished group ofphilosophers ofscience in (as put by the editor) "a free, critical interchange of views on the scientific status ofpsychoanalysis." The result, at least as recorded in this volume, was to this reviewer nothing short ofghastly. Rarely have I heard from such obviously distinguished and outstanding intellects such an astonishing display of naïveté, ignorance, and "sound and fury, signifying nothing" as is concentrated on these pages. The hapless psychoanalysts, also able men in their field, were simplyno match for the philosophers, who assailed them with eitherjeering ad hominem or "When did you stop beating your wife?" arguments or showered them with clumsy, amateurish misuse of psychoanalytic concepts allegedly in their support. Toward the end of the volume, a few more level-headed commentators bring the discussion to a more reasoned and appropriate level, notably Wesley Salmon, Gail Kennedy, Francis Grämlich, andJohn Hospers. This reader, however, was exhausted and exasperated before reaching their discussions and, ifnot committed to this review, would long before have given up. Perhaps the best review ofthe book (and the conference) is to be found in the cool, sensible, and cogent remarks ofJohn Hospers, associate professor ofphilosophy at Brooklyn College. I will quote a few passages that reflect some ofmy own reactions: As I try to get a composite picture ofthe results ofthe conference, the thing that stands out most in my mind is the lack ofgenuine communication between the psychoanalysts and the philosophers. Psychoanalysts are, quite understandably, too busy treating patients to have acquainted themselves with the latest guns in the arsenal ofepistemology and philosophy ofscience, and are therefore at a loss to reply to the charges leveled at them by the philosophers in the way the philosophers want. Thephilosophers,for their part, are—equallyunderstandably—ignorant ofthe vast amount ofempirical detail garnered by psychoanalysts in the last half-century as well as the complexity ofmany ofthe theoretical concepts employed in psychoanalysis. The inevitable result is that each party to the dispute only feels confirmed in his previous suspicions, namely that the other party's remarks are either incompetent or irrelevant, given to making either scandalously overblown claims or excessively demanding systematic requirements [p. 336J. And, speaking ofthe philosophers, he says: One unfortunate effect is that they are too often taken in by their own dialectical maneuvers— analyzing an argument in meticulous detail while ignoring certain crucial presuppositions, or straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel, orjust simply failing to take their elaborate theorizing with a humble grain ofsalt. Another effect is that, in a natural (but explainable) resistance to psychoanalysis they assume the role ofcarping critics without giving its manifold data a sympathetic hearing, or trying fairly to see what psychoanalysis is endeavoring to do; they try it in the balance and find it wanting on the basis ofa few unguarded statements by Freud, or they demand ofit a schematic rigor greater than any ofwhich it is now capable and reject it without further ado—things they would never dream ofdoing in fields where they were less personally involved. Most unfortunate ofall, they are content to criticize from the outside, accusing the psychoanalyst ofmaking all kinds ofunprovable or a priori pronouncements, having all the while only the meagerest conception ofwhat psychoanalysis I57 is all about, and not bothering to familiarize themselves in specific detail with the vast accumulation of behavioral data upon which the conclusions ofpsychoanalysis are based. Though specialists in scientific method, they refuse to look through Galileo's telescope [p. 349]. Hospers examines with skill and calmness many of die totally illogical arguments used in this conference, permitting one to end the volume with a faintly restored faith that one day there will be "a free, critical interchange ofviews on die scientific status of psychoanalysis" between philosophers ofscience and psychoanalysts. Ifthere is any lesson to be drawn from this kind ofexhibition, it is that there is no substitute for firsthand...