Psychiatric evidence and discretionary life sentences

Abstract

The criteria for imposition of a discretionary indeterminate sentence derive from the three principles described in R. v Hodgson (1968). The Court of Appeal has indicated that the decision that the defendant complies with the second principle, namely that he or she is a person of unstable character likely to commit such offences in the future, should, with few exceptions, be based on medical evidence. In this study, a series of 50 consecutive Appeal Court judgments reported over a 10-year period are examined. The various forms of mental abnormality, outlined in the psychiatric reports, which were viewed by the courts as contributing towards evidence of unstable character, are described. A critical question facing the sentencer is whether the defendant presents an unacceptable risk of significant harm to others and psychiatrists would appear to play an important part in assisting such decision-making. Wider issues in relation to the role of psychiatric evidence in indeterminate sentencing proceedings are discussed.