Abstract

Several organizations use auctions in a procurement bidding system to maintain a low procurement cost. Although several privacy-preserving auction solutions for different application scenarios have been proposed over the past few decades, none of them can perform efficient average procurement bidding while ensuring strong privacy protection for the bids of suppliers. To address this problem, we propose PSPAB, a lightweight, secure average procurement bidding system based on cryptographic tools, to provide full privacy for bids. In addition, this system allows the procurement manager to identify the users in the case of double spending. We formally prove the security of PSPAB under a semi-honest adversary model. Experimental results validate the theoretical analysis and practical application of PSPAB in real-world scenarios.

Highlights

  • Nowadays, government organizations and private businesses use various auction mechanisms for procuring goods and services

  • We formally prove that PSPAB is secure under a semi-honest adversary model through simulations

  • The computation complexity and communication complexity in this phase mainly originate from Algorithm 4. This phase is executed between the procurement manager (PM) and the procurement agent (PA) to seek out the supplier with the bid closest to the average of all the bids by the secure minimum circuit (SecMin) garbled circuit

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Summary

Introduction

Government organizations and private businesses use various auction mechanisms for procuring goods and services. PSPAB: Privacy-preserving average procurement bidding system with double-spending checking. A privacy-preserving framework with double-spending checking should be designed for an average procurement bidding system. A collusion-resistant e-auction was implemented with a smart contract [7] These two mechanisms do not provide privacy protection for bids during the entire procurement process, as the bids would be revealed eventually. Wang et al proposed a privacy-preserving and truthful double auction for a heterogeneous spectrum based on cryptographic primitives [9] None of these studies provide the double-spending checking functionality. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first to provide a double-spending checking functionality for a procurement bidding system This indicates that we can detect the double-spending behaviors of suppliers who intend to submit a bid more than once for improving their winning probability.

Related work Sealed price auction
Experimental results
Conclusion and future work
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