Pseudo-Mysterianism of Colin McGinn

Abstract

Colin McGinn claims that there is a naturalistic solution of the mind-body problem, but it is not constructive. That is, according to him, there is a natural and simple explanation of consciousness-brain interaction; however, because of our limited cognitive capacity we can never specify the link between the mind and the brain. Scientific explanation of the problem cannot be possible, so solution of the consciousness problem will remain an epistemic mystery for human beings. McGinn’s theory which is the basis of his mysterianism, is called Transcendental Naturalism (TN), and he formulates this theory with three main arguments. The main purpose of this work is to reveal that McGinn's arguments are baseless and that his mysterianism is pseudo-mysterianism. To achieve this purpose, I will discuss TN by respectively analyzing his three main arguments and their problematic aspects. Firstly, I will draw attention to McGinn’s first argument – I will call it “(i) the argument for naturalism.” Secondly, I will draw attention to the second argument which I will call “(ii) the argument for closure,” and I will show that McGinn’s cognitive closure idea on which epistemic mystery of consciousness is mainly based is also problematic. After briefly explaining his last argument which I will call “(iii) the argument for dissolution,” at the end of this work, I will have manifested that (i)-(iii) are not a satisfactory triad to leave the problem of consciousness to dark side, and McGinn’s mysterianism is pseudo-mysterianism.