Abstract
<p>The article provides an analysis concerning grounds for the deletion from the list of attorneys-at-law in Poland. The author distinguishes two spheres within the status of attorney-at-law: 1) the right to practice as an attorney-at-law and 2) the membership of the professional self-government of attorneys-at-law. Individual grounds are assessed in terms of the impact of their occurrence on both these spheres. The article discusses the effect caused by resolutions on the deletion from the list of attorneys-at-law, adopted as a result of emergence of the statutory grounds for the deletion in each of these spheres.</p>
Highlights
The Act of 6 July 1982 on Attorneys-at-Law1 governs a number of aspects of the membership in the professional self-government of attorneys-at-law (National Bar of Attorneys-at-Law)
Pursuant to the Act, the membership of attorneys-at-law and trainee attorneys-at-law in the professional self-government is compulsory (Article 40 (2) of the Act). The nature of this affiliation is linked to the purpose for which such structures have been established in the Polish legal system. This purpose is expressed in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland2
U a dualistic concept of the status of legal attorney-at-law, which manifests itself in the existence of two fundamental spheres of this status, correlated with the emergence of the grounds for deletion from the list of attorneys-at-law
Summary
The Act of 6 July 1982 on Attorneys-at-Law governs a number of aspects of the membership in the professional self-government of attorneys-at-law (National Bar of Attorneys-at-Law). The resolution on this subject is an administrative decision. It should be assumed that the day when the decision on total or partial incapacitation becomes final will not determine the date of termination of the membership in the professional self-government This cannot be changed, in the author’s opinion, by the fact that on that date a statutory criterion for registration on the list of attorneys-at-law, namely full capacity to perform acts in law, becomes not applicable. There are no grounds to assume, as mentioned above, that the previously discussed civil-law construct of the effectiveness of acts of a representative deprived of full capacity to perform acts in law
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