Proxy War in Indochina

Abstract

Whatever the wisdom of the Carter Administration's judgment that we have now reached the stage of rough strategic parity or nuclear stalemate in our relations with the Soviet Union, and that the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the USSR are sufficiently large, diverse, and survivable that neither side has an incentive to strike first in a crisis situation,x we must not therefore assume that the Chinese or Soviet Communists will forego other strategies to extend their influence through force and violence. The developing nations seem more aware of this than most Americans. The 1978 Conference of Nonaligned Nations in Belgrade expressed concern about the growing phenomenon of proxy war. While the nuclear balance of terror may rule out overt military confrontations in the northern hemisphere, such confrontations may well be initiated or prolonged by Communist proxies in the Third World; and there appears to be little to prevent outside Communist powers from plunging into a Third World conflict if they have the determination to do so.2 Until the Vietnam experience is well behind us, any American president is sure to use extreme caution before deciding upon military intervention in a Third World crisis. He will not, and legally cannot, undertake sustained major military assistance efforts in a hot war situation until he is reasonably certain of support from a substantial number of the American people and the Congress.3 With the tolerance level for American intervention sharply reduced, it is difficult to predict under what circumstances the United States might provide large-scale military support to a Third World nation experiencing a direct military threat. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the USSR continues systematically to project power beyond the Warsaw Pact area. If the Soviet Union can assume with impunity the role of a patron whose assistance or presence 13