Provisional Politics: Kantian Arguments in Policy Context (review)

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Reviewed by: Provisional Politics: Kantian Arguments in Policy Context E. Regina Helfrich Elisabeth Ellis . Provisional Politics: Kantian Arguments in Policy Context. New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2008. Pp. xiii + 194. Cloth, $50.00. In this short but intriguing book, Elisabeth Ellis tackles the problem that our political language is misleadingly full of clashes between conclusive political principles, when in fact our political actions necessarily take place in a world too complex and changing for such fixed answers. Drawing upon the work of Immanuel Kant, Ellis proposes to clarify [End Page 249] our political talk and reasoning by replacing the language of conclusive principles with that of provisional reasoning. It is the aim of the book to describe a theory of provisional politics derived from Kant's political writings, to show that provisional reasoning is a better tool for modern-day democratic politics than conclusive reasoning, and to demonstrate the effectiveness of provisional reasoning about political policies through a series of case studies of contemporary political issues. According to Ellis, to theorize provisionally is to "always leave open the possibility of entering into a rightful condition" (4). In particular, provisional theory takes as a given that agency and plurality are basic conditions of politics—not that they are "absolute precepts," but rather "conditions of principled political action as such" (6). Throughout the book, Ellis evaluates the merit of particular political policies on the basis of whether they promote greater agency and plurality, both in the present day and in terms of future developments. Provisional reasoning is "provisional" because it allows for the justification of temporarily unjust situations or decisions in the near term for the sake of increased political freedom (agency and plurality) in the long term. Ellis places high value on the process of democratic deliberation, and in chapter 2 argues that it can best be encouraged by three means: "protected discursive enclaves, overlapping authoritative institutions, and empowered citizens with the leverage to make a political difference" (17). She devotes less space than I would like to fully explaining and defending these three elements as especially beneficial for democratic discourse. Instead, the argument moves relatively quickly to in-depth treatment of concrete political problems such as the loss of widows' property rights in Kenya. Kant scholars will be interested in Ellis's extensive discussion of Kantian political principles and the ubiquity of provisional right—even for rights such as personal property and national citizenship—in contrast with traditional social contract theories. In brief, Ellis argues that, for Kant, "the only natural right is the right to autonomy," and all other political right is provisional insofar as no existing society meets (or ever could meet) the conditions of the ideal republic (61). Kant scholars should also find interesting Ellis's unique interpretation and sustained analysis of the dictum fiat iustitia, pereat mundus as directed against "rulers who would otherwise behave with partiality," instead of justifying "the dogmatic promotion of one's own right" (11). While Ellis's provisional theoretical analysis of particular concrete political situations is sound and at times enlightening, I was often left wondering whether it would not be possible to arrive at similar conclusions via different theoretical methods. Ellis's analysis of the Kenyan widows' plight struck me as relying heavily on distinctions already recognized by feminist theorists (such as that between the language of international human rights and the language of local cultural customs) and arrives at a conclusion (we should analyze the value of each discourse for its best effect in the particular local context) that I think feminist scholars could easily have developed without the use of provisional theory. As an overall approach to political problem-solving, I found myself wondering what benefits lay specifically in using Kantian provisional theorizing rather than, for example, philosophical pragmatism. Ellis does not address this issue directly, or acknowledge the possibility that the particular policy conclusions arrived at through her Kantian provisional theory might equally well be calculated on the basis of another philosophical political system with the same results. Would not pragmatists also argue that they have a philosophical system that can account for the temporary persistence of unjust situations for the sake of greater long-term...