Abstract

In many rural areas the management of natural resources is confronted with the tragedy of the common problem; not only historically but also in modern times. Especially where biodiversity loss appears and ecosystem services (ESS) decline, the lack of public management might be related to inappropriate institutional setups. Two distinct directions of thought prevail on the subject. On one hand, proponents of property rights and minimal state intervention eagerly analyse the feat of modern institutions and view private property and payments for ecosystem services (PES) as solution. On the other hand, common pool resource management (CPM) has regained interest because nature is not a straight commodity and cooperation in ESS provision is needed (partly also to facilitate PES). In this paper, the two aspects are combined in a hybrid institution. We suggest a new way of approaching institutional questions in ESS provision as synthesis of private and publically controlled ESS provision. It is contemplated as ESS governance of local eco-nets given the potential for inclusion of public management. In principle, the result is a controlled framework of land sharing between farm land (private ownership) and communally managed land (public ownership). Some land is devoted to hedges, wetlands, etc. Land is an immobile resource and can be used for EESs based on planned species prevalence, whereas communities compete also for labour which can move (or not). Governance is acting in competing constituencies and is a mean to control the regulating entities (public ESS management). At a meta-level we combine the need for public management with advantages of a competitive neo-classical framework. This contribution to CPM investigates a model of a group whose well-being is based on ESS provision in a cultural landscape. By statutory regulations, land (field margins), is ex-tracted from farms for ESS; in particular a leader (called reeve) guides farmers. Two institutions are compared: (1) labour in public land for ESS based farming (i.e. it is controlled by public authority), or (2) it can migrate seeking higher rents in neighbouring communities.

Highlights

  • The management of common pool resources (CPR) in cultural landscapes, as connected to farm communities, has gained new attention among practitioners and scientists in many countries, both developed and less-developed

  • To work out such interest in detail, i.e. for a mathematical concept of achieving an ecological objective “s” as goal to be programmed, we suggest dealing with economics of minimizing costs given an ecological target

  • Institutional aspects of ecosystem services (ESS) provision were discussed with respect to spatial ESS provision in a landscape for habitats

Read more

Summary

Introduction

The management of common pool resources (CPR) in cultural landscapes, as connected to farm communities, has gained new attention among practitioners and scientists in many countries, both developed and less-developed. A reliable commitment ought to be imbedded in an institutional frame assuring physical appearance of BD, regulations on provision and shared payments In this regard, detailed delivery concepts like “BD through eco-nets” have been proposed, which are driven by ecology rather than farm interest (ecoagriculture: [5]). (Note: an emphasis is frequently on ESS delivery as synergies between land parcels and habitats by using deliberate interactions of “net design” [7]) In such cases, ESS can benefit communities as public goods, as well as the public acts as a provider of ESS; and only under the condition of a “good” governance (at minimal cost here with coordination) where might be acceptance of regulations. Assuring participation and getting site specific regulations, is necessary for the establishment of ESS in a landscape

Institutions
Common Pool Resource Management in Case of BD Provision for ESS
Objective of the Study
Outline and Study Design
Individual Land and Eco-Net Allocation
Formal Depiction and Operationalizing
Objective
Social Welfare
Rearranging for Labor and Land Access
Political Economy Bargaining Model and Game Solution
Manager’s Interest
Revision of Farmers’ Interest
Modelling “Supply” and “Demand” for a Generic Social Optimum of ESS Provision
Willingness to Contribute Land and Labor for Negotations
Willingness to Contribute Fees and Public Demand
10. Amendment of the Interest Function for Bargaining
11.2. Tamed Manager
12. Summary
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.