Providing a Deputy to be Shot: Hegemonic Stability, Regional Powers, and Trade in the Developing World

Abstract

Empirical evaluations of hegemonic stability theory have dwindled in the decades since the theory's inception in the late 1970s. This decline is partially a result of the limited number of hegemons the discipline has collected data on given that most projects only extend back to 1816 and only capture the tenures of Great Britain and the United States. This study overcomes the small-n problem by applying this theory of global power behavior to regional microcosms. Given the theoretical and empirical developments in the preceding decades, this paper articulates and tests two propositions for the period 1950-1990: 1) Expanding US power has a direct effect on the trade activity of states in developing regions and, more interestingly, 2) regional powers act as agents to a global hegemonic principal in expanding trade. The statistical evaluations presented here suggest that the articulated preferences of regional powers have a significant effect in determining the level of trade engaged in by the observed state. Thus, while unobstructed hegemony is most effective in increasing trade flows, rival regional powers are the second best option for liberalization.