Abstract
Abstract Against the Epicureans who conceive the gods as indifferent to make them inaccessible to anger, the Stoics assert that the god is incapable of anger due to his very benevolence. However, doesn’t the Stoic god’s concern for man threaten his impassivity and expose him to feel anger and passions? In this paper, I address, in a theological context, the classic ethical problem of the compatibility between the integrity of the individual and his concern for others. Several hypotheses are examined. Is divine benevolence merely a disposition to do good to human beings, devoid of any affection for them? If it is a feeling, is it an aspiration to the very exercise of the virtue of benevolence, rather than to the good of mankind in itself? Or could it be understood, in the context of the cosmic οἰκείωσις, as the god’s care for his own parts? Finally, should not we distinguish, in god’s philanthropy, between the φιλία he feels for the wise men and the ἔρως he feels for everyone else?
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