Provably secure identity-based identification and signature schemes from code assumptions.

Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo,Bo Song,Yiming Zhao

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0182894

Abstract

Code-based cryptography is one of few alternatives supposed to be secure in a post-quantum world. Meanwhile, identity-based identification and signature (IBI/IBS) schemes are two of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives, so several code-based IBI/IBS schemes have been proposed. However, with increasingly profound researches on coding theory, the security reduction and efficiency of such schemes have been invalidated and challenged. In this paper, we construct provably secure IBI/IBS schemes from code assumptions against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks through a provably secure code-based signature technique proposed by Preetha, Vasant and Rangan (PVR signature), and a security enhancement Or-proof technique. We also present the parallel-PVR technique to decrease parameter values while maintaining the standard security level. Compared to other code-based IBI/IBS schemes, our schemes achieve not only preferable public parameter size, private key size, communication cost and signature length due to better parameter choices, but also provably secure.

Highlights

In 1994, Shor published a quantum algorithm [1], which could ruin public key cryptography based information security as we know it today
The digital signature is a well-known cryptographic tool for demonstrating the authenticity of digital messages or documents. When it comes to identity-based digital signature, the verifier only needs to know the name or email address instead of a long and awkward public key of the signer
We first propose provably secure identity-based identification and signature schemes with the PVR signature [19] technique applied in the user key extraction algorithm

Summary

Introduction

In 1994, Shor published a quantum algorithm [1], which could ruin public key cryptography based information security as we know it today. The digital signature is a well-known cryptographic tool for demonstrating the authenticity of digital messages or documents When it comes to identity-based digital signature, the verifier only needs to know the name or email address instead of a long and awkward public key of the signer. We first propose provably secure identity-based identification and signature schemes with the PVR signature [19] technique applied in the user key extraction algorithm. It does not rely on the indistinguishability between a binary Goppa code and a random code, whereas it is required in the CFS signature scheme and has been invalidated by the distinguisher.

Code-based cryptography

Identity-based identification and signature

Scheme description

Security

Parameters and security

Conclusion