Abstract

Authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols are multi-party protocols in which entities exchange public information allowing them to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities over an open network. Recently, in order to circumvent the key escrow problem inherent to ID-based cryptography and the certificate management burden in traditional public key infrastructure, the notion of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was introduced. In this paper, we first present a security model for certificateless AKA protocols for three parties, and then propose an efficient construction based on bilinear pairings. The security of the proposed scheme can be proved to be equivalent to the computational Diffie–Hellman problem in the random oracle model.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.