Prototypes or Pragmatics? The Open Question of Public Attitudes Toward Enhancement

Abstract

Banja (2011) nimbly analyzes how a particular strain of conceptual myopia corrodes the rigor of “moral conservative” arguments in bioethics, particularly on the topic of human enhancement. We find his prototypist angle meritorious, but demur on a key conclusion: that virtue essentialism’s “prospects for remaining popular, especially among nonbioethicists and the electorate, are exceedingly good.” Our primary concern is that this prediction, despite enjoying a priori appeal, lacks empirical support. Gathering data on ordinary citizens’ moral intuitions about enhancement not only will prove worthwhile for its predictive value, but also will lend a helpful measure of nuance to debates on an important normative question: how public opinion should factor into policy decisions on biopolitical issues. We heartily agree with the central philosophical thrust of the article, as the picture of category-mediated reasoning emerging from prototype theory poses a vexing and potentially insurmountable challenge to arguments from naturalness, dignity, giftedness, et cetera, all aimed at establishing prohibitions on the use of cognition-enhancing pharmaceuticals. Moreover, we do not dispute the premises that Banja recruitsinsupportofhisforecastregardingthepopularityof such arguments. He elaborates that to the folk, virtue essentialist arguments, being “dogmatic, certain, and absolute,” sound“justthewaymoralargumentissupposedtosound.” One could suggest that preliminary support for Banja’s thesis can be found in examples such the comment thread on the CBS News website in reaction to its 60 Minutes segment on the illicit use of prescription stimulant medications by university students (CBS News 2010). Even a cursory review of the comments reveals explosions of moral outrage. However, there is a danger in relying too heavily on public comments such as those just cited, for they draw not on public opinion writ large but rather on the sentiments of a particular public—those sufficiently motivated by the television program to vent their frustration. What is not known is whether the general public shares those sentiments (Nadler and Reiner 2010). It may in fact be the case that the anxieties of the general public over cognitive enhancement rest for the most part not on philosophical op