Protohistory: Unending intuitions

Abstract

AbstractPhilosophers ponder on how to do philosophy and how to do it well. This pondering has divided metaphilosophers' concern about philosophical methodology into two groups, which we could label “pro‐history” and “pro‐intuition.” The claim (and belief) of philosophers who are in the “pro‐history” group can be found in this sentence by Robert Pasnau (2011): “The discipline of philosophy benefits from a serious, sustained engagement with its history.” Those in the “pro‐intuition” group believe that for philosophy not to slide into the realm of irrelevance it must rely on intuitions to make sense of our present ontologies, rather than study history of philosophy. This paper argues that both proponents of the pro‐history and those of the pro‐intuition approach are wrongheaded. It argues for what it calls protohistory. Protohistory here refers to the method of doing philosophy in which the intuitions of philosophers are informed by the history of philosophy (though not directly influenced by it but indirectly informed by it).