Abstract
The shift away from Aristotelian jurisprudence had a number of consequences. It gave rise to a vision of political order spawning two contrasting traditions of juridical thought (exemplified by Grotius and Hobbes) that continue to exert their influence. By erasing the idea that all understanding of human action and institutions must draw upon the evaluative understandings of practical wisdom, it enforced upon us an exhaustive division between the neutral cognition of social facts and the evaluation or prescription of action. This rendered problematic the nature of the doctrinal scholar’s exposition of the law, for the doctrinal scholar appears upon the face of things to render the law intelligible by relating its content to comprehensible values. Finally it generated a split between prescriptive and analytical jurisprudence that obscured important issues and sent generations of legal theorists on a largely time-wasting errand.
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