Abstract

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we analyse the pricing strategies and the level of digital rights management (DRM) protection in a two-echelon digital product supply chain that consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. Two different market structures are considered: Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) and Vertical Integration. We show that the manufacturer could obtain more profit than the retailer in the MS model, and the joint profits of both sides in the VI model is no less than in the MS model. Further results are obtained by comparative analysis. We also examine how the quality of the digital products and the copyright enforcement impact the development of strategies. Our analytic results can help the firms choose appropriate DRM policy and optimal pricing for their products. It is also expected that the results can give an advice for the government developing the appropriate copyright enforcement.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.