Protecting Trajectory From Semantic Attack Considering ${k}$ -Anonymity, ${l}$ -Diversity, and ${t}$ -Closeness

Abstract

Nowadays, human trajectories are widely collected and utilized for scientific research and business purpose. However, publishing trajectory data without proper handling might cause severe privacy leakage. A large body of works is dedicated to merging one’s trajectory with others’, so as to avoid any individual trajectory being re-identified. Yet their solutions do not provide enough protection since they cannot prevent semantic attack, which means the attackers are able to acquire individual’s private information by using the semantics features of frequently visited locations in the trajectory even without re-identification. In this paper, we are the first to recognize the semantic attack, which is another severe privacy problem in publishing trajectory datasets. We propose an algorithm providing strong privacy protection against both the semantic and re-identification attack while reserving high data utility. Extensive evaluations based on two real-world datasets demonstrate that our solution improves the quality of privacy protection by three times, sacrificing only 36% and 10% of spatial and temporal resolution, respectively.