Protecting the Vote? Peacekeeping Presence and the Risk of Electoral Violence

Hannah M Smidt,Hanne Fjelde

doi:10.1017/s0007123421000132

Hannah M Smidt, Hanne Fjelde

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123421000132

Copy DOI

Abstract

AbstractDemocracy assistance, including the promotion of electoral security, is often a central component of contemporary peacekeeping operations. Preventing violence during post-conflict elections is critical for the war-to-democracy transition. Yet little is known about the role of peacekeepers in this effort. To fill this gap, this study provides the first comprehensive sub-national study of peacekeeping effectiveness in reducing the risk of electoral violence. It combines geo-referenced data on peacekeeping deployment across all multidimensional peacekeeping missions in Africa over the past two decades with fine-grained data on electoral violence. The analysis finds a negative association between peacekeeping presence and the risk of electoral violence. The relationship is of a similar magnitude in the pre- and post-election periods. However, the association is more strongly negative for violence perpetrated by non-state actors compared to violence perpetrated by government-affiliated actors. Analyses using two-way fixed-effects models and matching mitigate potential selection biases.

Highlights

We examine the relationship between UN peacekeepers and electoral violence across subnational administrative units in all countries that hosted a UN peacekeeping mission in Africa from 1994 to 2017
Our study shows that local-level deployment of UN military forces can affect the peacefulness surrounding the local vote in elections in war-torn countries: we find robust support for the notion that a UN military presence reduces the overall risk of electoral violence
Our analyses suggest that peacekeepers may be able to avoid some of the unintended consequences that plague the record of international election monitoring missions, as peacekeepers do not seem to incite violent contention related to elections, or geographically shift electoral

Summary

Introduction

In the context of post-conflict elections, and given the legacy of the previous civil war, peacekeeping interventions likely have an added value because, at baseline, the reputation and implementation costs associated with electoral violence are usually small (Höglund 2009; Lyons 2004). While we generally expect that the local presence of peacekeepers will be associated with a lower risk of electoral violence, the effect might be more pronounced in particular periods and related to specific actors.

Results

Conclusion