Protecting Sentient Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of Lay Intuitions on Standing, Personhood, and General Legal Protection.

Eric Martínez,Christoph Winter

doi:10.3389/frobt.2021.788355

Abstract

To what extent, if any, should the law protect sentient artificial intelligence (that is, AI that can feel pleasure or pain)? Here we surveyed United States adults (n = 1,061) on their views regarding granting 1) general legal protection, 2) legal personhood, and 3) standing to bring forth a lawsuit, with respect to sentient AI and eight other groups: humans in the jurisdiction, humans outside the jurisdiction, corporations, unions, non-human animals, the environment, humans living in the near future, and humans living in the far future. Roughly one-third of participants endorsed granting personhood and standing to sentient AI (assuming its existence) in at least some cases, the lowest of any group surveyed on, and rated the desired level of protection for sentient AI as lower than all groups other than corporations. We further investigated and observed political differences in responses; liberals were more likely to endorse legal protection and personhood for sentient AI than conservatives. Taken together, these results suggest that laypeople are not by-and-large in favor of granting legal protection to AI, and that the ordinary conception of legal status, similar to codified legal doctrine, is not based on a mere capacity to feel pleasure and pain. At the same time, the observed political differences suggest that previous literature regarding political differences in empathy and moral circle expansion apply to artificially intelligent systems and extend partially, though not entirely, to legal consideration, as well.

Highlights

The prospect of sentient artificial intelligence, distant, has profound implications for the legal system
Of the nine groups surveyed on, sentient artificial intelligence had the lowest perceived current level of legal protection, with a mean rating of 23.78
The group perceived as being most protected by the legal system was corporations (79.70; 95% CI: 78.25–81.11), followed by humans in the jurisdiction (61.88775; 95% CI: 60.56–63.15), unions (50.16; 95% CI: 48.59–51.82), nonhuman animals (40.75; 95% CI: 39.41–42.24), the environment (40.38; 95% CI: 39.21–41.69), humans living outside the jurisdiction (38.57, humans living in the near future (34.42; 95% CI: 32.83–36.15), and humans living in the far future (24.87; 23.36–26.43)

Summary

Introduction

The prospect of sentient artificial intelligence, distant, has profound implications for the legal system. Moral philosophers have argued that moral consideration to creatures should be based on the ability to feel pleasure and pain (Bentham, 1948; Singer, 1973; Gruen, 2017). Insofar as artificially intelligent systems are able to feel pleasure and pain, this would imply that they would be deserving of moral consideration. Insofar as the basis for granting legal consideration is based on moral consideration (cf Bryson, 2012; Bryson et al, 2017), this would further imply that sentient AI would be deserving of protection under the law

Methods

Results

Conclusion