Abstract

This paper investigates variation in the design of labor provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) by focusing on the power of trade unions, the role of government partisanship, and the relative strength of skilled labor. We expect strong trade unions and left-leaning governments to be associated with more, and more far-reaching labor provisions in PTAs. We also expect the strength of skilled workers relative to the strength of unskilled workers to negatively correlate with the depth of labor provisions in PTAs. In addition, the effect of trade unions should be conditional on both the presence of left government and democracy. We test these hypotheses relying on an original dataset of labor provisions included in 483 PTAs signed between 1990 and 2016. This dataset covers 140 different labor provisions that relate to six overarching dimensions. The quantitative analysis finds support for the expectations concerning the influence of trade unions and the role of a country’s skill profile.

Highlights

  • Many of the preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed over the past twenty years include labor provisions (LPs).1 These LPs link the benefits of better market access to, for example, the enforcement of internationally recognized worker rights

  • PTAs signed by countries with a high skilled to unskilled labor ratio are less likely to protect labor rights comprehensively than PTAs concluded by countries where the relative power of skilled to unskilled workers is low

  • Using the novel LABPTA dataset that covers 483 PTAs signed between 1990 and 2016, our quantitative analysis finds strong support for these expectations, especially those concerning the role of trade unions and a country’s skill profile

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Summary

Introduction

Many of the preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed over the past twenty years include labor provisions (LPs). These LPs link the benefits of better market access to, for example, the enforcement of internationally recognized worker rights. As will be demonstrated below, in spite of the rapidly growing literature on the design of PTAs, the investigation of such questions in relation to LPs in PTAs has largely remained an uncharted territory To fill this gap, our paper looks at domestic factors that determine the inclusion of and variation in the design of LPs in PTAs. In particular, we argue that trade union power and government ideology affect the presence and depth of such provisions. The strength of trade unions matters more for the design of LPs in PTAs if they try to influence a democratic government than if they need to convince a non-democratic government Overall, these findings offer strong support for our argument about the impact of domestic factors on the design of LPs in PTAs. Protecting labor rights in preferential trade agreements: The role

Literature review
The argument
Dependent variables
Predictors
Control variables
Empirical analysis
Robustness checks
Conclusion
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