Prostitutes, Sex Surrogates and Sugar Babies

Abstract

Prostitution is a categorically moral activity, sexual surrogacy and sexual assistance are hypothetically moral, while sugaring is hypothetically immoral. First, some moral objections to prostitution will be refuted and it will be argued that prostitution is moral in principle. Second, it will be argued that sexual surrogacy and sexual assistance can be morally justified under certain assumptions. In that sense, they are hypothetically moral activities. Third, sugaring is immoral, unless its reason and conditions are known to both parties in the transaction. As this is mostly not the case, sugaring is hypothetically immoral. If sugaring is however not based on cheating, it is consensual and hence morally justified. In terms of moral adequacy, the taxonomy is as follows, in decreasing order of morality: prostitution, sexual surrogacy/assistance, sugaring. It will be shown that the moral adequacy of these activities is very similar from the perspectives of utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics. Finally, it will be contended that prostitution, sexual surrogacy/assistance, as well as morally appropriate forms of sugaring (mostly via sugaring agencies) ought to be encouraged by the state.