Prospects of European-Chinese Contest for Influence in the Western Balkans: The Case of Serbia

Abstract

Immediately after the breakup of former Yugoslavia, the US has emerged as the single most important external actor in the regional dynamics of the Balkans. Using NATO as a vehicle, in strategic terms, it became a security overlay; the Kosovo war being a peak of its role in this context. It has effectively operated key international missions and operations (SFOR and IFOR in Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo) and induced the creation of important regional organizations and initiatives, most notably the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). Over the last two decades, however, the EU has been emerging as a key external player in the Balkans: it initiated (at the Koln summit in 1999) the creation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe; established its largest ever civilian mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), while substituting IFOR and IPTF in Bosnia with EUFOR (Operation Althea) and EUPM, and conducting two missions in North Macedonia (then-FYROM; Concordia—military mission, and Proxima—police mission). Additionally, after the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 64/298, the EU took upon the role of the main facilitator in Belgrade–Priština dialogue. It has also aspired to include new member states from the Western Balkans, through the Stabilization and Association Process and accession negotiations. During this period, it has also emerged as the single most important trading partner for the region. The rise and growing international assertiveness of China, however, threatens to challenge the dominant EU role in Central and Eastern Europe in general and Western Balkans in particular. The case of Serbian–Chinese relations, as illustrated by the economic partnership, infrastructure investments, police cooperation, Serbian openness to Chinese new technologies, and political cooperation in international fora (not least on the issue of Kosovo) might indicate that the EU role is far from secure in the foreseeable future. Apparent lack of the EU strategy to reinvent its regional role, as well as growing interest in the region of other external actors (most notably, but not limited to, the US, Russia, and Turkey), all point toward the possibility of the reshaping of regional power structures, with uncertain outcomes. Approaching the issue from a dominant realist understanding of great power competition and spheres of influence while taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of diverse theoretical approaches, the author analyzes the relevance of the Serbian case for the broader matter of European–Chinese relations.