Prospects for a counterfactual theory of causation

Abstract

My aim is to defend a counterfactual analysis of causation against purportedly decisive difficulties raised recently, many rehearsed and developed further in this volume. Although some of the moves I will make are available to any counterfactual theory, my principal aim is to explain how a theory I outlined elsewhere can, with some adjustment and simplification for the purposes of discussion, deal with a range of problems (see Noordhof 1999 for original presentation of the theory). Specifically, I will be concerned with the issue of whether the semantics of counterfactuals can be characterized independently of causation (raised by Dorothy Edgington, this volume), the proper way to deal with the nontransitivity of causation (raised by Michael McDermott 1995 and Murali Ramachandran, this volume), and a collection of counterexamples to the idea that causation involves, at its heart, chance-raising (discussed in this volume by Helen Beebee; Phil Dowe; Doug Ehring; Chris Hitchcock and Michael Tooley, and by Jonathan Schaffer (2000a, 2000b)). Obviously, in defending my own counterfactual theory, I am also implicitly arguing that counterfactual approaches to causation in general have the resources to capture its important features. The ambiguity in the title thus accurately reflects the content of the present paper.