Prosecutorial Experience, Ideology and Panel Effects: Evidence from the Netherlands

Abstract

One of the fundamental principles of the judicial system is neutrality. Judges must be not be predisposed. Although experience accumulated off the bench could positively impact judicial decision-making, such experience must not have prejudicial consequences for the parties before the judge. In practice, experience matters. Within the vast body of research on the impact of personal characteristics on judicial behavior, I focus on one particular group: public prosecutors. Legal scholars and social scientists have argued that judges with prior prosecutorial experience impose longer sentences on defendants. Other research has established a link between ideology and sentencing decisions. The empirical evidence is mixed. I seek to test the theory by analyzing the decisions of multi-member panels of judges on appellate criminal courts in the Netherlands. I find that a majority of chief judges with prior prosecutorial experience is associated with shorter prison sentences and that clawback measures are more likely if the majority is appointed by a more liberal government.