Prorogation and partisanship in Tasmania and South Australia

Abstract

SUMMARYThe historical evolution of the Westminster Parliament left the constitutional power over the summoning, dismissal, and temporary suspension of that body in the hands of the sovereign. As ‘Westminster-style’ parliaments developed in Britain's colonies, this aspect of the prerogative came to be exercised by colonial governors. As ‘responsible government’ evolved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both at Westminster and in its progeny, conventions developed whereby the ministerial executive advised the Crown on the exercise of this aspect of the prerogative power. Thus, while prorogation is a perfectly legitimate, routinely used device in Westminster-style parliamentary systems, ministries sometimes use it as a partisan tool, as it provides the opportunity for the executive to manipulate the parliamentary calendar for political advantage. This study examines cases of just such ‘partisan political use’ of prorogation in the Australian states of Tasmania and South Australia. Conditions commonly associated with this type of use of prorogation in these two states are identified as: the existence of a proximate issue of a highly controversial or partisan nature; minority or near-minority status in the lower chamber; and a novel context leading to general uncertainty and higher than usual partisanship. In addition, a question is raised regarding whether the institution of a fixed-term parliament regime may increase the likelihood of a particular variety of partisan use of prorogation. The findings are situated in a comparative context.