Abstract
This paper analyzes management and control issues linked to the employment of traders who engage in proprietary trading activity for their employer (a bank). The bank can invest in control and monitoring of these traders, and the paper evaluates the profitability of such investments. We find that the investment in control is distorted due to interfering market microstructure effects. The bank is inclined to underinvest in control of its traders because traders who are not too closely monitored generate extra liquidity in the market. Bank supervision might be needed, therefore, to correct for such effects. We evaluate the effectiveness of the value-at-risk capital adequacy requirement proposed by the Bank for International Settlements, and find that this approach correctly targets the banks that are the most vulnerable, i.e. those that are the most at risk of underinvesting in its control and monitoring systems.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
