Abstract
ABSTRACT This essay presents the chief reasons for making a distinction between propositional and doxastic justification and, also, points out two things: (1) no theory of propositional justification implies a theory of doxastic justification; (2) infinitism is, essentially, a theory of propositional justification. Additionally, this paper tries to shed some light on the three conjointly sufficient conditions for a proper infinitist view of propositional justification.
Highlights
This distinction can be traced back to Keith Leherer's Knowledge2
Though, seems relevant because of the strong influence he has exerted on the field
(...) the evidence which completely justifies his [the gypsy lawyer] belief does not explain why he believes as he does, his faith in the cards explains that, and the evidence in no way supports, reinforces or conditionally or partially explains why he believes as he does. Since his belief is completely explained by his faith in cards, the evidence is irrelevant to explaining why he believes as he does
Summary
This distinction can be traced back to Keith Leherer's Knowledge2. Albeit he does not use terms like “propositional” and “doxastic justification”, he makes the distinction very clearly. Not every set of proposition for which the objective epistemic relation holds will be part of a structure of reasons suitable for S.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
