Abstract
This study analyses the structure of incentives for introducing proportional representation into the institutional framework of authoritarianism by focusing on the 2004–9 reform of Russia's regional election laws. Statistical analysis supports a preliminary theory and a set of hypotheses according to which the varying degrees of the use of proportional representation in Russia's regions are conditioned by the interests and strategies of the involved political actors, including power-maximisation strategy of the federal authorities and the risk-aversion strategy of the region-level actors.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
