Property without authority? Between natural law and the Kantian state

Abstract

ABSTRACT In Territorial Sovereignty, Anna Stilz seeks to combine a Kant-inspired moral justification of the state with a natural law-inspired account of ‘foundational title’. The aim of my essay is to show that the contrasting ways in which these two frameworks conceptualize the relation between property (or rights over objects more generally) and authority lead to tensions on two levels of Stilz’s own argument. Concerning individuals’ occupation of land, the question is why some rights over objects can be acquired pre-politically (i.e. occupancy rights), while others cannot (i.e. property rights). And concerning states’ claims over territory, it is unclear whether state entrance basically ‘absorbs’ our political obligations, or whether states have a duty of justice to establish more ambitious (and possibly coercive) forms of global government. The underlying question is whether, or to what extent, Stilz remains committed to Kant’s unconditional justification of territorial sovereignty and, if so, how the very idea of natural rights (over objects in particular) can be made to fit into such an account.