Abstract

A variety of stakeholders have proposed different models of urban regeneration of China, and indicate an institutional arrangement that is more complex than a model dominated by the government or neoliberal interests. This study argues that the path to an effective property-rights regime for urban regeneration has become circuitous as it has needed to follow the trial-and-error process of institutional transition in China. Operational-level rights originally assigned to different actors have been gradually reclaimed by the land users and by the effect of market forces through ‘property-rights regime in transition’. Four rounds of regeneration were observed in Jinhuajie, Guangzhou over the past three decades, indicating the adoption of four property-rights regimes that have evolved sequentially, namely, a semi-open market for neighbourhood redevelopment, a semi-open market for land occupied by state-owned enterprises, an open market for redevelopment and an open market for both redevelopment and refurbishment. Each property-rights regime only reassigns one or two bundles of operational-level property rights from one actor to another to provide opportunities for older organisations to adapt to the new system. This inevitably led to an interweaving urban fabric and sub-optimal results of urban regeneration. This research suggests greater attention should be paid to cases of regeneration in different contexts as well as the interactions among the various stakeholders.

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