Property in Software

Abstract

Although computer software now qualifies for copyright protection in most developed countries, questions concerning the moral foundations of property rights in software and the ethics of copying software persist. Many continue to resist the notion that the unauthorised copying of commercial software products is unethical and some have even advanced principled arguments in defense of their views. I shall argue here that, while the concept of intellectual property in software is in keeping with justice and good ethical practice, we should be prepared to adjust the rules and our intuitions as necessary in order to get the greatest social utility out of this rapidly evolving technology. Arguments concerning intellectual property rights in software need to be anchored in the more general principles that define and justify property rights in general. At the most general level, these have taken two forms: on the one hand, the appeal to the notion of moral right understood in MnaturaT or Kantian terms, and, on the other, consequentialist appeals to social utility. I shall set aside the former, certainly not because such considerations are uninteresting or irrelevant, but because attempts to establish property rights as moral rights tend to get bogged down in deeply philosophical quandaries concerning foundations. A more practical approach, and one particularly useful in addressing the issue of proprietary interests in software, is suggested in the writings of economist Friedrich