Abstract
In six studies, we consistently observed costly third-party punishment (3PP) to decrease under ambiguity of the norm violation. Our research suggests that, under ambiguity, some people experience concerns about punishing unfairly. Those with higher (vs. lower) other-oriented justice sensitivity (Observer JS) reduced 3PP more pronouncedly (in Studies 1-3 and 4b, but not replicated in Studies 4-5). Moreover, those who decided to resolve the ambiguity (hence, removing the risk of punishing unfairly) exceeded the 3PP observed under no ambiguity (Study 4). However, we did not consistently observe these concerns about punishing unfairly to affect 3PP (Studies 4-5). We further considered whether people could use ambiguity as justification for remaining passive-thus, avoiding the costs of 3PP. We did not find conclusive evidence supporting this notion. Taken together, ambiguity entails a situational boundary of 3PP that sheds light on the prevalence of this behavior and, potentially, on its preceding decision-making.
Highlights
Third-party punishment (3PP) can manifest itself in a wide range of phenomena, from confronting discrimination to speaking up againstbullying
The multilevel models from Studies 1 and 2 consistently showed that the ambiguity of the norm violation significantly reduced 3PP—supporting H1. In both studies, Observer justice sensitivity (JS) and not Perpetrator JS significantly moderated the effect of ambiguity
The logistic regression model showed that this decision was not predicted by Observer JS, Wald(1) = 0.61, p = .539, odds ratio (OR) = 1.09, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.82, 1.46], nor Perpetrator JS, Wald(1) = 0.77, p = .439, OR = 1.12, 95% CI = [0.85, 1.47]—not supporting H3a–b
Summary
Third-party punishment (3PP) can manifest itself in a wide range of phenomena, from confronting discrimination to speaking up against (cyber)bullying It refers to sanctioning reactions against someone who violates a norm (i.e., perpetrator) by uninvolved bystanders. Empirical evidence from lab studies has shown that 50% to 60% of people engage in 3PP, with higher sanctions the more unequal the distributions are (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al, 2006). Most of these studies provided decision-making settings with perfect situational information, allowing third parties to identify swiftly whether particular distributions constituted violations of fairness or equity norms. We investigated how ambiguity of the norm violation influences direct 3PP and aimed to shed light on distinct motivations underlying this effect
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