Abstract
Proof-Carrying Code Based Tool for Secure Information Flow of Assembly Programs
Highlights
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest of information flow security analysis due to their connection to the problem of protecting confidential data
The main result of this study is a security technique for verifying assembly programs for secure information flow
To make all the components and concepts of the proposed security technique more concrete, a tool, which is called SPARC Proof-Carrying Code (PCC)-SIF, was developed for verifying SPARC assembly programs for secure information flow based on the proposed security approach
Summary
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest of information flow security analysis due to their connection to the problem of protecting confidential data. The confidentiality policy concerns multi-level security systems. It states that secret data must be protected during the computation and there should be no leakage of that data through public output channel. Information flow security is formalized as noninterference, which states that final values of lowsecurity variables must be independent of initial highsecurity variables[1]. Information flow security analysis verifies if a program respects certain confidentiality policy. Denning and Denning[2] were first to perform static information flow analysis for checking programs for confidentiality
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