Prompting the Benefit of the Doubt: The Joint Effects of Auditor-Client Social Bonds and Measurement Uncertainty on Audit Adjustments

Abstract

We design an incentivized experiment to test whether measurement uncertainty elevates the risk that social bonds between auditors and reporters compromise audit adjustments. Results indicate that, when audit evidence is characterized by some residual uncertainty, the adjustments our auditor-participants require are sensitive to whether auditors have an opportunity to form a modest but friendly social bond with reporters. In contrast, although auditors do not adjust fully even when misstatements are known with certainty, social bonding has no effect in this scenario. Accordingly, our experiment contributes beyond the main effects of social bonding and measurement uncertainty demonstrated in prior research by showing that these forces are interdependent. A practical implication is that audit firms’ expanded use of in-firm specialists and concurring partners when determining audit adjustments to complex accounts can confer both technical benefits from expertise and social benefits from a more distanced assessment that is less influenced by day-to-day interactions with client personnel.