Promoting green buildings in China's multi-level governance system: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Abstract

Multi-level governance (MLG) represents a big challenge in promoting green buildings (GBs) in China. This study aims to provide policy insights for promoting GBs under MLG. The dynamic interactions and evolutionary processes among the central government, local governments and developers in China's MLG context are investigated through a tripartite evolutionary game model. This study first analyses the decision-making behaviour of each participant and then the stability strategy among multiple stakeholders in the MLG system. Numerical analyses are performed to simulate the stable strategies and evolution paths, evaluating key factors and proposing policy implications. The findings reveal that the central government plays a guaranteed role in promoting GBs, while consumers' high willingness to pay for GBs plays a vital role. Interestingly, incentive local governments slow down the realisation of GB promotion, whereas incentive consumers are more efficient than developers. Furthermore, increasing punishment by local governments is more efficient than that by the central government. These results may inform research hypotheses for future empirical studies and provide a valuable reference for promoting GBs under MLG in other countries.